What the Future 'Might' Brings. Mind, forthcoming.
How Strong is a Counterfactual? (with Ginger Schultheis). Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. [penultimate draft]
Agentive Modals (with Matthew Mandelkern and Ginger Schultheis). The Philosophical Review, 126: 3, 2017. [penultimate draft]
Abilities and Success. Proceedings of the 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium. [forthcoming]
Attitudes, Conditionals and Margins for Error (with Ginger Schultheis). Proceedings of the 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium.
Miners and Modals. Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 22, 2018. [published version]
Strengthening Principles and Counterfactual Semantics (with Ginger Schultheis). Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium, 2017. [published version]
I Believe I Can Phi (with Matthew Mandelkern and Ginger Schultheis). Proceedings of the 20th Amsterdam Colloquium, 2015. [published version]
Work in Progress
Agglomeration and 'Ought'
I argue that deontic but not epistemic 'ought's agglomerate. I give a theory that predicts this by appealing to the idea that a proposition can be epistemically, but not deontically, better than all the particular ways for it to be true.
[R&R at Mind] [draft]
Attitudes, Conditionals and the Qualitative Thesis (with Ginger Schultheis)
We show that, in standard frameworks, a plausible margin for error principle stands in tension with what we call the Qualitative Thesis, the thesis that, if you leave open p, you should be sure that if p, q iff you should be sure of the corresponding material conditional. We give a new framework for attitudes and conditionals to reconcile the two.
[R&R at Journal of Philosophy] [draft]
Success and Ability
This paper considers the status of the principle that success entails ability, which I call Success. I argue Success is highly puzzling: it looks required to validate certain other plausible inference patterns; and yet it has counterexamples. I resolve the puzzle by showing we can invalidate Success while validating those related inferences by connecting the meaning
of ‘can’ to the facts about what is settled or open.
Know-How is Knowing You're Able
I consider new linguistic data about know-how, involving entailments to ability, negation and free choice. I argue only an intellectualist view, specifically one where knowing how is knowing you're able, correctly predicts these data.